Indigenous Struggles for Land Rights in Twentieth-Century Ecuador

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Conflicts on the Zumbahua hacienda in the highlands of the South American country of Ecuador in the 1930s and 1940s present insights into the nature of rural social relations. Both wealthy landholders and Indigenous agricultural workers experimented with discursive elements as they attempted to draw state authorities to their side. Following their debates also inverts the normal view of power relations. The landholder, General Francisco Gómez de la Torre, presented himself as a victim, while his workers used various combinations of class and ethnic discourse to mobilize their base and gain sympathy from outsiders. The failure of government officials to support Gómez de la Torre exposed significant cracks in the ruling structures, which Indigenous workers learned to exploit. These conflicts reveal that the Ecuadorian government was not as hegemonic as is sometimes assumed; it was an arena of competing projects and interests with political officials often at odds with one another. At the same time, subaltern resistance was also not homogeneous, and divisions between Indigenous workers challenge a simplistic picture of a unified counter-hegemonic discourse. As a result, state power formed a showcase for many different groups to present and contest their social and economic interests.

A long and rich historiographical debate surrounds the topic of rural protest in Latin America. Historians have often interpreted dissent

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as emerging in the midst of a clash between tradition and modernity. Peasant resistance becomes a conservative, reactionary, and ultimately futile attempt to preserve traditional societies from a quickly disappearing past. Elites argued that Indigenous peoples’ best hope would be to assimilate into the dominant white or mestizo population. To the surprise of many, Indigenous peoples emerged at the end of the twentieth century leading politically engaged, militant, and active social movements. Rather than a reactionary force that feared change, Indigenous peoples recognized the unjust nature of the ownership of the means of production and were proactive in altering social and economic relations. As historian Vincent Peloso discovered, their “rightful dissent” challenged “the hegemonic position of the planters” and questioned “the legality of planter ownership of the land.” The story of Zumbahua is part of a broader history of Indigenous peoples protesting the manner in which elites attempted to craft state structures without their consent or consideration of their interests.  

Attempts to explain subaltern resistance often come back to Russian revolutionary León Trotsky’s observation that “the mere existence of privations is not enough to cause an insurrection; if it were, the masses would always be in revolt.” Rather, as Crane Brinton underscored in his classic study *The Anatomy of Revolution*, mobilizations often emerge out of growing hope and the promise of progress rather than mounting oppression and despair. Scholars have shown that successful social movements rely on the presence of strong organizations, mobilization of resources, development of solidarity networks, awareness of political opportunities, and the consolidation of an identity that provides a struggle with a logical cohesion. New studies lead to critical perspectives that caution against seeing Indigenous peoples as a homogenous and hegemonic force. Competing claims and ideas for how to remake the world underlay events at Zumbahua.  

On February 9, 1938, Indigenous workers on Ecuador’s Zumbahua hacienda wrote to government officials to protest that their attempts to negotiate with the hacienda’s renter had met with failure. The renter had “promised to improve treatment, to increase wages, to provide us with the tools for cultivation, and not to demand from us differential balances for taking care of livestock, gathering wool, and other positions that are customary on haciendas.” The letter stated “for that reason we
come before you to request your intervention, for a more humane and respectful treatment for the workers, the return of Indigenous peoples who have been removed from their homes, the payment of wages, and the elimination of free work demands.” The letter concluded with the hope that the director of the governmental agency that owned the Zumbahua hacienda would “definitively know how to help us in the task of our liberation.”

By the late 1930s protests for land, higher salaries, and better treatment had become common on haciendas in Ecuador and throughout the Andes. Standard histories of Indigenous resistance, however, fail to mention the Zumbahua hacienda. Had Indigenous uprisings become so widespread that the events on this hacienda were deemed relatively insignificant? Alternatively, was the unrest notable but the hacienda’s isolated location prevented outsiders from learning of these events, thereby creating a “hidden history”? Furthermore, much of the rural protest from this period came to public attention through the efforts of urban allies in the Communist Party. Rural activists at Zumbahua petitioned the government with the assistance of a lawyer from the competing Socialist Party. Zumbahua’s invisibility could be a result of the fragmented nature of Ecuador’s popular movements, with those reporting on the protests emphasizing only the actions of their political allies.

Pointing to the significance of the Zumbahua case, anthropologist Mary Weismantel—one of few people to study the area—testifies that in the 1980s “the people of Zumbagua remember that political turmoil has often led to Indigenous deaths at the hands of white authorities, both before and after the end of the hacienda.” A local official discovered a clandestine graveyard, presumably of assassinated Indigenous leaders, when he built his office on the site of the former hacienda. Elder people spoke with pride of their reputation as a rebellious population. One resident, Manuel Guanotuña, notes that “fierce Indians have always lived here,” recounting that they joined Atahualpa’s Inka general Rumiñahui in fighting against the Spanish conquest and have continued that tradition of resistance. How these conflicts played out and how they have been ignored in subsequent histories reveal as much as they conceal about how state power and social relations were constructed and contested in the Latin American countryside.

These protests took place in the 1930s during a period of profound
economic crisis and severe political instability. It was also a time during which urban workers organized new labor unions (with the number jumping from four to almost seventy during the decade) and leftist activists founded new political parties. Protest spread to rural areas as conflicts erupted on estates that the government had expropriated from religious orders in the aftermath of Eloy Alfaro’s 1895 liberal revolution. The Zumbahua hacienda, located in the north-central highlands, had passed from the Jesuits (evicted from Spanish America in 1767), to the Augustinians (expelled in 1875), and Redentoristas, and then finally to the government’s Junta Central de Asistencia Pública (JCAP, Public Assistance Coordinating Body). Under government administration Zumbahua was leased for eight-year periods to absentee hacendados (landholders) who delegated responsibility to a group of well-paid mayordomos (employees). Relations between these mestizo managers and the contracted Indigenous huasipungueros (workforce) tended to be conflictive, largely because of the mayordomos’ heavy-handed role in implementing the hacendados’ wishes, as well as their own desire to raise their class standing through a rigorous implementation of their employers’ desires.6

Haciendas remained an economic and political force unto themselves, accustomed to running their affairs without outside involvement. Zumbahua’s dispersed population and a lack of infrastructure, including roads and telecommunications, limited the extent of governmental intervention. The closest governmental authority was the teniente político (political lieutenant) in the parish center of Pilaló, five hours away by horse. Weismantel observes that “in living memory,” Latacunga, the provincial capital of Cotopaxi, “was an arduous two-day trek, with a long, cold night spent in the páramos of Tigua.” Quito was still farther away although, with an increase in vehicular traffic, that distance eventually began to shrink.7

In 1934 the JCAP rented the Zumbahua hacienda to General Francisco Gómez de la Torre. Educated in foreign military academies and representing a trend toward modernizing Ecuador’s military forces, Gómez de la Torre’s supporters presented him as “the perfect example of a professional officer.” He was an influential man who ruled as part of a seven-man provisional junta following a 1925 revolution that overthrew the increasingly corrupt liberal government that had held power...
since 1895. While previous renters at Zumbahua had their share of problems and difficulties, Gómez de la Torre’s new rental contract seemed to usher in a period of heightened antagonism on the hacienda. A flood of correspondence between the hacendado, his workers, the government, and the lawyers for each of these increased exponentially in the late 1930s and early 1940s.\(^8\)
At the center of this controversy was a group of five Indigenous workers: José Trinidad Chaluisa, Ventura Chaluisa, Nicolas Chaluisa, Juan Manuel Pallo, and Francisco Eduardo Ante. Together, individually, or as a smaller group of two or three, these activists constantly bombarded hacienda and government officials with petitions that became increasingly repetitive and perhaps reached an average of one a month. The five were determined to establish their legitimacy on the hacienda and the validity of their complaints. The Chaluisas asked “not to be deprived of the right to live on the land where we were born and where for more than forty years we have served and enriched so many renters.” Pallo and Ante claimed that “we have lent our services as huasipunguero peons on the Zumbahua hacienda for twenty-five years, having distinguished ourselves for our honesty and dedication to the work.” They complained of “the Zumbagua hacienda’s current administration’s handling of the attempts to take land away from the best and oldest peons under the pretext that they are allegedly leaders of an Indigenous movement.” After so many years on the estate these leaders were not young and reckless rebels, who stereotypically lead resistance movements, but rather more elderly workers with deeply established roots on the hacienda. “The quality of our work and our qualities as peons have been sufficiently demonstrated,” the Chaluisas wrote in one petition. Underscoring their success, they proclaimed that “the huasipungos that we currently possess are the largest on the hacienda.” Arguably, it was not privation but growing expectations, as well as organizational experience, that led them into positions of leadership and protest.9

Almost all of the correspondence from the Zumbahua workers came through Gonzalo Oleas, a Socialist Party lawyer from Quito, who wrote in the name of the “Indigenous huasipungueros.” It is unclear how and why Oleas became involved in the resistance at Zumbahua, although it was part of a broader pattern of growing urban leftist involvement with rural struggles. In contrast to the relative distance and isolation of Zumbahua, much of the leftist involvement took place on estates closer to urban centers, which facilitated communication and the building of solidarity linkages. Furthermore, other rural leaders commonly worked with the Communist rather than Socialist Party. Oleas also appeared to be at odds with his party, expelled in 1938 for working with José María
Velasco Ibarra’s Populist Party. His work in bringing the Zumbahua protest to government attention was seemingly done as a lone individual rather than as part of a broader political campaign.\textsuperscript{10}

This use of intermediaries in negotiating relationships between the city and the countryside has a long and varied history, but one that is often not well understood. Allan Kulikoff notes that in the United States, “the relationship between countryside and city is an understudied theme in the history of rural capitalism.” The same is true for Latin America where a largely uneducated peasantry relied on intermediaries to prepare the written documents that were required for their interactions with the government. These intermediaries, benefiting economically from their education and social status, were not always ideologically committed to the needs or concerns of the petitioners. Oleas’s motivation remains unclear. Government officials maintained that he was seeking financial gain through the exploitation of an ignorant and uneducated population. But he may well have had more altruistic aims in assisting an impoverished and exploited rural people.\textsuperscript{11}

Most of Oleas’s petitions were directed to JCAP Director Gregorio Ormaza or to other officials in the Ministry of Social Welfare in Quito. The petitioners turned to government officials only after failing to gain redress from Gómez de la Torre. “Only two years ago,” one letter stated, “José T. Chaluisa, Ventura Chaluisa, and Nicolas Chaluisa were expelled after being labeled Indigenous agitators, simply for having requested a decrease in the tasks imposed by the administration, tasks that could not be completed in less than two days by the strongest man.” Abusive mayordomos were common targets of complaint. One missive specifically requested Ormaza’s “valuable intervention to remove the employees Carlos Olivia, Enrique Bravo, Juan Hidalgo, and Manuel Hidalgo who exercise their authority over the peons by means of the stick and the whip, as if there were no other language or means of understanding between us and the hacienda’s administration.” Notably, the request was not to change government policies, but for the petitioners, state power became an arena to contest labor relations on the hacienda.\textsuperscript{12}

The complaints yielded concessions. Ricardo Cornejo, an assistant in charge of a Ministry of Social Welfare commission to Zumbahua, facilitated the signing of an agreement with Bravo and Hidalgo. Cornejo
recommended that the hacienda comply with the minimum wage law, pay women at the same rate as men, provide the necessary tools, pay *huasicamas* (domestic house servants) wages, and reduce the level of *tareas* (tasks) that, while nominally taking an individual one day to complete, in fact required the labor of an entire family. In early 1938 Gómez de la Torre responded that he had improved the conditions of his workers by more than 300 percent. He declared his “firm resolution to cancel the contract” governing the rental of the hacienda if new obligations were imposed that substantially altered his original lease. Furthermore, he stated that some of these demands were impossible to implement and would not only damage the junta, but also the renter, “and even the Indigenous peoples.” Like his workers, Gómez de la Torre sought to use state power to advance his class interests. This was not the first time that Zumbahua workers complained to the government, and Cornejo was skeptical that it would be the last. The ministry was far “from meeting the aspirations of the workers.” Rather than closing a chapter, the accord only seemed to introduce a new and more intense level of conflict that drew the government in as a central player in local disputes.\(^{13}\)

The promulgation of a Labor Code under the government of General Alberto Enríquez Gallo on August 5, 1938, dramatically changed the nature of the discourse and the demands of agricultural workers on the Zumbahua hacienda. The labor code was a progressive document that regulated relations between workers and employers, including the establishment of a minimum wage, the implementation of an eight-hour work day, and the legalization of the right to organize and strike. In addition, the code dedicated an entire section to the rights of agricultural workers, creating legal spaces that Indigenous workers and their urban leftist supporters could exploit. Almost immediately, references to the labor code began to appear in Oleas’s petitions on behalf of the Zumbahua workers. Pallo and Ante complained that “without justifiable cause and simply because the current renter of the Zumbagua hacienda does not consider leaders in the application of the norms established in the Labor Code, we have been evicted from the hacienda without rights to compensation.” Gómez de la Torre had fired them “for having requested the elimination of the unpaid huasicama service and using their animals to fertilize fields, requirements that Article 263 of

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the Labor Code forbids. We have also demanded the elimination of the forced purchase of crops, animals, and other belongings of the peons, traditions which Article 263 of the Labor Code also outlaws.”

Ventura and José Trinidad Chaluisa subsequently wrote to the social welfare minister to complain that mayordomo Manuel Hidalgo had confiscated animals from the peons and pressed them into service without payment. Referring to the right of petition guaranteed in the constitution, they stated that “no one can pact our slavery, nor commit us for work without our consent, and even less the JCAP, created for the realization of the state’s objectives in favor of the humble and needy, which should not be limited to the maintenance of hospitals and child-care facilities.” They called for work that was “more just, less onerous, and sticking more closely to the law.” This knowledge of specific aspects of legislation, as well as a willingness to engage and manipulate legal issues to their own benefit, challenges Lilo Linke’s assertion in the 1950s that “Indians do not know that a Labor Code exists.” In fact, pointing to the importance of the code, the Indigenous newspaper Ñucanchic Allpa translated and published relevant sections in Kichwa so that it would be more readily available to a rural proletariat. While the Zumbahua hacienda was geographically isolated, the workers were aware of current policies and employed them to their maximum advantage.

Dating back through hundreds of years of Spanish colonization in Latin America, a trilogy of landholders, the military, and the Catholic Church represented governing economic and political interests against an exploited Indigenous peasantry. By the 1930s those alliances had fractured, but not always in ways that were immediately obvious. The most overt was the Liberal Party’s anti-clericalism that led to the expropriation of Church-owned haciendas at the beginning of the twentieth century. What is more difficult to understand is the relationship between General Gómez de la Torre and government officials. In earlier conflicts, the JCAP almost immediately took the side of the landholder class against Indigenous protesters. At Zumbahua those alliances were not so automatic, perhaps due to shifting governmental interests in the 1930s or perhaps because the workers were not so clearly linked to the Communist Party. For whatever reason, government policies soon became a realm to debate traditional social and labor relations on haciendas.
On July 9, 1939, Minister of Social Welfare Augusto Durango issued an order to evict the three Chaluisas from Zumbahua. Gómez de la Torre noted that this order had not produced any result, for as soon as the police left, the leaders returned. He requested the permanent expulsion of the Chaluisas because “this is the only guarantee for the workers on the hacienda, and more than anything the only way to impede the unmerciful exploitation with which certain very well-known lawyers victimize the Indigenous peoples.” A month later Durango requested that the minister of government command the provincial governor to notify the Chaluisas that they were to leave the Zumbahua hacienda immediately. Gómez de la Torre reported that “as was foreseen, the leaders received this notification as if it did not have any value. Rather, they have gone to Quito, surely to meet their lawyer, leaving the Ministry’s order without any force.” Despite Zumbahua’s geographic isolation and the distance and difficulties of travel to the capital, this constant contact between rural and urban areas reinforces Gilbert Joseph’s assumption that research will lead to “blurring the conventional distinction between rural and urban life.” While often seen as two vastly separate worlds further isolated by class and racial divides, their realities were more closely bound together than has been commonly assumed.16

The Zumbahua activists also showed evidence of urban knowledge, although they only indirectly addressed issues of public policy in their petitions. Rather, they used governmental mechanisms to insist that their demands were just because the contract between huasipungueros and the hacienda renter was based only on the huasipungo plot and salary, and other unpaid service demands were illegal. Interestingly, Gómez de la Torre argued that all of the services he demanded from Indigenous workers were customary and that he had assumed the estate with the understanding that these traditional services were included. According to his argument, the failure of workers to fulfill their customary obligations, and the junta’s failure to ensure this, invalidated his rental agreement. That is, Gómez de la Torre insisted that the huasipungueros were legally required to provide customary services. However, the traditional model of haciendado authority over the entire life of huasipungos was based precisely on paternalistic relations and ongoing negotiations of mutual obligations. These were highly personalized relationships rather than institutional ones and therefore lost validity if the
administration of the hacienda changed hands. Claims by temporary lease-holders to “traditional” services had a rather hollow ring. Consequently, Indigenous workers insisted that the law required that all unpaid services be abolished and that the hacienda purchase tools for their work. They requested “more humane and less brusque treatment than they currently receive from the hacienda’s employees whose only language... with the Indians is the whip and club.” They insisted that they did not love fighting or permanent restlessness, and if the junta would address their concerns, the quality of their work would improve 100 percent.\footnote{17}

Gómez de la Torre responded by insisting that there were not any huasipungueros at Zumbahua, only yanaperos (from the Kichwa yanapana, to help) who worked only one or two days a week on the hacienda but yet enjoyed all the benefits it provided, including firewood, pasture, and water. Unlike huasipungueros, they did not have access to small plots of land. In making this assertion Gómez de la Torre was—in his mind—modernizing the means of production on the estate, moving away from feudalistic styles of exchange and eventually toward a wage labor system. Such modifications, he claimed, improved the situation on the hacienda 400 percent. Complaints of abuse were not only false, but also slanderous, and should be discarded. He claimed to pay for the work done on the hacienda and that the Chaluisas were expelled legally and with a judicial order from a judge and the labor inspector.\footnote{18}

As the complaints and petitions continued to pour in, Gómez de la Torre became increasingly agitated with his troublesome workers and their lawyer and also with the government’s refusal to defend his interests. He indignantly insisted that the accusations of “the lawyer of the Indigenous peoples of Zumbahua are completely and absolutely false.” He rented the hacienda with the understanding that the JCAP held the ultimate power over the estate, but yet he had to contend with numerous commissions both from the junta as well as from the Social Welfare Ministry investigating the situation. Under his care, he claimed, the situation on the hacienda had improved 500 or 600 percent. “As I’ve said a thousand times,” the hacendado proclaimed, “my background, my social situation, my temperament, my education make it impossible that I or my subordinates would treat anyone badly. The inhabitants of Zum-
bahua,” he concluded, “have never been as well treated as they are now.” He saw permanent expulsion of the leaders as the only solution.

In November of 1939 Gómez de la Torre received his wish when the government agreed to send the police to Zumbahua to evict the leaders and re-establish order and discipline on the hacienda. As before, it was easier to issue these orders than to carry them out. As of January 1940, the troublemakers were still on the hacienda, and in March the government again issued an order for sixty police officers from Tungurahua to evict the troublemakers. Six months after the original order, Gómez de la Torre complained that the junta was unable to carry through with its dictates. He commented on “the remarkable fact that the Junta de Asistencia Pública rented to me an estate that either does not belong to them, or over which they exercise no effective control.” In fact, he declared, the junta was not functioning as the true owner of the hacienda. This situation had dragged on for more than two years and resulted in financial losses for him. Stating that he had exhausted all legal recourse, he now proclaimed that he no longer would be responsible for the estate’s inventory, would stop his quarterly rent payments, sue the junta for damages he suffered as a result of their failure to maintain control over property, and return it to the junta once he had been reimbursed for these losses.

Repeatedly the government made declarations that seemingly had little effect on what was happening in Zumbahua. On July 12, 1940, the teniente político in Pilaló once again received a ministerial resolution authorizing the expulsion of three huasipungueros. In response to the eviction edict, the Chaluisas wrote with Oleas’s assistance to the Social Welfare Ministry to argue that the expulsion was illegal because it relied on an old law that regulated relations between owners and industrial workers. Instead, Articles 283, 284, and 449 of the current Labor Code stipulated that labor inspectors, not the local tenientes políticos, should regulate these work disputes. The Indigenous workers attempted to play a game of jurisdictional authority, arguing that since the junta was based in Quito they should be under the authority of Pichincha’s labor inspector rather than the local inspector from Latacunga. Logically, they thought that they might attain more favorable judgments from liberal politicians in Quito rather than from local institutions dominated by hacendado interests. This frustrated Gómez de la Torre who complained
that his workers claimed that they did not have to follow his orders nor those of local authorities because “they have their lawyer, and only the Ministry has the right to call them.” In Peasants on Plantations, Peloso advocates looking at the interplay between hegemony and resistance in order to understand “relations between the powerful and the powerless sectors of agrarian society.” Similarly, at Zumbahua rural workers were neither effectively “co-opted nor submitted to planter domination.” Instead, they became increasingly adept at playing two—or more—government bodies off of each other and appealing to state rhetoric in their attempts to gain concessions from local landholders.21

Ormaza continued to insist that the Labor Sub-Ministry order the labor inspector in Latacunga to collaborate with the police to end the turmoil. In a surprising development in September of 1940, the local inspector—whose rulings the protesters previously had attempted to avoid—ordered “the return in peremptory form to the Indigenous Chaluisas their huasipungos on the Zumbahua hacienda.” Gómez de la Torre reminded the junta’s director that “the Chaluisas left the estate under orders from the work authorities and after I had paid them all that they thought they were owed.” Nevertheless, they persisted to exploit the hacienda’s resources for their own benefit. He pleaded that “the junta put an end to this situation that is so damaging to my interests and threatens a loss of control over the estate.” It was impossible to continue like this: “everyone orders, everyone takes advantage of the estate,” he wrote, “except for the junta and me.” The junta had not fulfilled its obligations, and so he could not be held accountable for losses on the hacienda. “I do not only ask but I demand,” Gómez de la Torre concluded, “that the junta do something to save the hacienda’s property and defend my interests, without need for legal action. Silence is not advisable in this case.” A balance of power seemed to be shifting toward the Chaluisas, and the general felt betrayed by a government that no longer respected its traditional alliances.22

Without an acceptable response, Gómez de la Torre wrote to the junta for the “hundredth time” complaining that “today the Indigenous inhabitants of the hacienda are in open rebellion, have insulted and threatened the administrator and other employees.” He asked, “aside from the pain that the deaths of these loyal servants and excellent workers would represent,” who would pay if they were killed? “It sickens me
with sadness to see that the junta has such consideration for two rebellious Indians who, calling themselves leaders, ruin the hacienda, establish disorder, propagate a bad example, put in danger the lives of more than a dozen agents of order, and ruin me economically! No one would believe that things like this happen in a civilized country!” Even if his employees’ lives, political order, or economic situation were not important to the junta, Gómez de la Torre declared, the junta should still take care of its property. He complained that “neither the junta nor the supreme government has taken seriously the defense of the only patrimonial that the needy have.” The needy, of course, were not impoverished Indigenous workers on the hacienda, but the widows and orphans who benefited from the government’s social services. It was not only the general who complained that his pleas fell on deaf ears. The three Chaluisas repeatedly pressed the Social Welfare Ministry that the Labor Code required proper treatment of workers. Since there had been no sanctions against employee abuses, the petitioners requested that the ministry intervene on their behalf before the junta. Increasingly, state power became a constantly evolving arena for contesting local work conditions on the hacienda.23

What began as a relatively simple dispute between Indigenous workers and an absentee hacendado regarding customary working conditions on a hacienda spun out of control as it encompassed an ever-broadening range of actors. To assist and counteract Oleas’s incessant petitions, Gómez de la Torre finally contracted his own lawyer, Carlos R. Cuvi, who had previously defended landowner interests on other haciendas, to argue his case before the junta. Since peons had taken over hacienda lands, Cuvi argued, he did not see how this could be construed as a labor problem (and hence under the dominion of the Labor Ministry), but declared that if the government wanted to see it like that they should solve the problem anyway. The attempt by the local labor inspector, under orders from the Social Welfare Ministry in Quito, to return workers who were expelled from the hacienda three years ago was not helping the situation. Zumbahua’s workers’ claims of ownership of the estate were nothing other than a dangerous creole communism helped by the inactions of authorities who failed to prevent these events.24

With two of the protagonists, the workers and the renter, largely handing over the debate to their lawyers, the JCAP also brought in its
own legal expert to assess the situation. In response to Gómez de la Torre’s accusations, Alejandro Ponce Borja presented the director with his legal opinion that the nineteenth clause of the regulations that governed the renting of the haciendas absolved the junta of all responsibility for relations between workers and renters. “Neither the law nor the contract,” Ponce Borja wrote, “can establish any responsibility for the junta for work relations between third parties [the Indigenous workers] and the boss, the renter.” Traditional customs were not part of the contract governing Gómez de la Torre’s relations with the junta and could not be the basis for his complaint. Therefore, Ponce Borja was of the opinion that if the general failed to make his rent payments he would be in violation of his rental contract, and the junta could move against his deposit. As a government body, the JCAP was defending its own institutional interests. Increasingly, they were unwilling to take the side of either Indigenous workers or the hacendado.

Events at Zumbahua reached a six-way deadlock, highlighting the fractured nature of elite governing structures that subaltern activists managed to exploit. First, were the Indigenous workers and their lawyer, Gonzalo Oleas, who insisted on their rights. Francisco Gómez de la Torre and his lawyer, Carlos Cuvi, maintained that he was a modernizing landholder and innocent of all charges of abuse. Junta director Gregorio Ormaza advocated sending in the police to evict the leaders. The junta’s lawyer, however, argued that these were internal disputes that did not concern the junta. The labor inspector kept investigating the complaints but was unable to implement a permanent and stable solution. To complicate matters further, the Ministry of Government and its local police forces refused to evict the Indians from Zumbahua until the legal aspects of the dispute had been settled.

With the tension continuing to mount, and under pressure from Gómez de la Torre, Cotopaxi’s police chief Captain León Benigno Malo reported in regards to the “abnormal situation” at Zumbahua “due to the lack of discipline that reigns among the workers, incited by the eternal exploiters of the Indigenous class,” he was ready to comply with the Ministry of Government’s orders to arrest the Indigenous leaders. On December 2, 1941, the Ministry of Government announced that it had arrested these leaders but that it would release them in twenty-four hours unless formal charges were presented. Ormaza insisted that re-
leasing these leaders “without adopting precautions to prevent their return to Zumbahua would mean little other than handing the hacienda over to them.” Still, Gómez de la Torre demanded more action. Simply arresting the leaders was insufficient. Rather, he argued for “the absolute necessity” of expelling the Indigenous leaders’ families from the hacienda, where they continued to reside “taking advantage of all it had to offer without providing any service, and on the contrary blocking work on the property and fomenting in a scandalous manner indiscipline and insubordination among the rest of the workers.” Without this measure, “the expulsion of the leaders will have no effect because as soon as they are released from prison they will return, quite naturally, to the homes of their relatives on the hacienda, making a mockery of the law and of the rights of the junta and the renter.”

After the arrests the five leaders spent the next six months in a Latacunga jail, providing the government and Gómez de la Torre a temporary reprieve from their incessant petitions (it is unclear if charges were ever filed). After years of increasingly heated correspondence, this was the only example of overt governmental repression on the hacienda, but it seemed to have little lasting effect. Once they were released, the five leaders resumed the correspondence presenting themselves as “victims of the most unmerciful persecution from the renter in his drive to obtain the maximum return with a minimum investment.” They had been the “victim of a criminal maneuver” that the hacendado had designed to avoid paying them the salaries that they had earned over the last nine years. Neither the Social Welfare Ministry nor the junta had given proper attention to this issue, they argued. Inverting dynamics and rhetoric that previously had characterized relations on the hacienda, the five made this appeal, they claimed, in the spirit of protecting the junta’s interests. They requested that the junta not return to renting Zumbahua to “a boss who is so notoriously known as an enemy of agricultural peons, as is the case with F. Gómez de la Torre.” Furthermore, they insisted that the mayordomos and other employees on the hacienda be fired because of the “grave violations committed against the huasiangueros” and for triggering a “violent struggle between the administration of the estate and the agricultural workers on it.” When the Chaluissas heard rumors that the general’s rental contract with the junta may be rescinded, they appealed to a 1937 Ley de Comunas (Commune Law)
that recognized Indigenous communities to request that the huasipungueros be allowed to rent the estate. The petitioners cast themselves as victims and argued that this would be the best way to end abuses on the hacienda.\textsuperscript{27}

The Indigenous huasipungueros achieved a number of partial victories. When, in 1943, Gómez de la Torre returned the hacienda, he had to accept his losses and pay the monies owed to the junta. The workers did not receive the rental contract or the status of \textit{comuna}, but neither did they have to pay for lost production. Indeed, the JCAP made Gómez de la Torre sign an agreement that he would drop his claims against both the workers and the junta. The workers, however, did not receive the back wages they claimed they were owed. The worst abuses appear to have ended when the junta brought the hacienda under direct administration. Perhaps more important for the workers was the organizational capacity and political experience that they gained as a result of these conflicts.\textsuperscript{28}

With Gómez de la Torre gone, Zumbahua seemed to calm down. Correspondence returned to more mundane issues of the threshing of barley and harvesting of potatoes, the milling of sugar cane into aguardiente, and repairs to roads destroyed by the fierce winter rains. Still, half a year later the same five leaders once again presented a letter drafted by Oleas to the social welfare minister pressing some of the same concerns, especially the issue of salaries. They included an ever-growing list of legislation to support their demands, including a 1943 law that raised agricultural salaries by 50 percent, which indicates that they monitored national political developments. They complained about Manuel Hidalgo, a mayordomo who previously had been a target of complaints of abusive behavior and continued to work on the hacienda. Relatively little had changed, and the leaders continued to use state structures in attempting to improve working conditions on the estate.\textsuperscript{29}

These ongoing protests raise questions of who exactly were the Chaluisas. Although they often petitioned in the name of all peons at Zumbahua, they tended to monopolize the discourse and rarely mentioned other names. At certain points it was unclear whether these five leaders truly represented all Indigenous workers or just pressed their own personal agenda and economic interests.\textsuperscript{30}

On the surface, demands were always couched in terms of social
justice and working-class concerns. The archives, however, contain tantalizing indications of other social conflicts among Indigenous workers. The Chaluisas attempted to position themselves as solid and well-respected community members, as well as pointing to Gómez de la Torre’s greed in taking the best land away from the workers for his own use. But this also hints at a certain amount of jealousy that the Chaluisas’s financial and social success as middle peasants may have engendered from other less-well-off workers. The Chaluisas may have been expertly exploiting Oleas’s presence to advance their interests in ongoing community feuds that had nothing to do with the conflict with the current renter, which might also explain Gómez de la Torre’s confusion at being treated so poorly in his attempts to modernize the hacienda.

Internal tensions provide a possible explanation for this social conflict. In 1941 a labor inspector reported that community members resented the abusive actions of José Trinidad Chaluisa, who had positioned himself as a cacique (boss) and charged dues and attempted to claim the best land for himself. The inspector asked the Indigenous leader Francisco Ante, “if the employees are abusing them, and he emphatically stated that now they are treated fine, and that they do not have any complaints.” This is the only Indigenous voice in the archive from this period that criticizes the Chaluisas’s actions and presents a positive depiction of events on the hacienda. Other socio-economic data challenge the inspector’s portrayal of conditions on the hacienda, and it is questionable exactly how much the inspector could realistically see during the one day he spent on the estate. Particularly in a situation such as Zumbahua where there are incomplete archival records and a very thin oral tradition, it can be difficult to read back through the history to understand what was happening on the ground. Whether or not they were operating from the framework of an established “tradition” (and that itself is a problematic concept), the Chaluisas did present themselves as representing legitimate community interests while large landowners attempted to criminalize their dissent.31

One interpretation of this contradiction is that there may have been an authentic struggle for power among the Chaluisas and Ante and/or Pallo. Florencia Mallon has suggested that we not limit our use of the concept of hegemony—as an ongoing and incomplete process of balancing force and consent—to relations between dominant and subordi-
nate groups writ large, but that we also examine how these processes occur within rural communities in what she calls projects of “communal hegemony.” While the existing documentation does not allow a full analysis of these processes, it is certainly possible that the thoroughly political nature of these subaltern social actors was not only evident in their relations with the state and landholder, but also with each other.32

These are simply hypotheses and unanswered questions, for on many of these issues the documents are frustratingly silent. The Chaluisas never appear in broader histories of Indigenous resistance in Ecuador, nor are they included in a pantheon of rural heroes. In comparison, Augustín Vega from the neighboring Tigua hacienda helped found the Ecuadorian Federation of Indians (FEI) in 1944, the first national Indigenous organization, and Ambrosio Lasso from the neighboring province of Chimborazo is commonly championed as an important rural leader. The Chaluisas’s absence could be simply a function of their relative geographic isolation or a result of allying with the Socialist rather than Communist Party that helped organize the FEI. Alternatively, despite extensive correspondence and the framing of issues around social justice, their goals and complaints may simply have been too narrowly defined to be of interest or use to broader movements.33

What is apparent, however, is how both landholders and Indigenous workers experimented with discursive elements as they attempted to draw state authorities to their side. Francisco Gómez de la Torre presented himself as a victim in these struggles, while the huasipungueros used various combinations of class and ethnic discourse to mobilize their base and gain sympathy from outsiders. The Ecuadorian government was not as hegemonic as is sometimes assumed, but rather formed an arena of competing projects and interests with different political officials often at odds with one another. The failure of government officials to support Gómez de la Torre reveals significant cracks in ruling structures that Indigenous workers learned to exploit to their advantage. Subaltern resistance also illustrates the possibilities of inverting government institutions for their own purposes, and even fighting these structures to a standstill. Bringing agricultural workers back in to analyses of rural social relations is key to understanding how state power is constructed and what purposes it serves.
NOTES


9. Gonzalo Oleas to Director General de Asistencia Pública, Sept. 25, 1939, Comunicaciones Recibidas, Segundo Semestre, JCAP, pp. 820–21; Oleas to Director of the JCAP, Mar. 6, 1939, Comunicaciones Recibidas, Primer Semestre, JCAP, pp. 956–57. Alfredo Costales and Piedad de Costales note that huasipungo plots that workers received in exchange for working on the hacienda ranged from about two to twenty-nine hectares, with the larger plots indicating more prestige. See, Alfredo Costales and Piedad de Costales, Zumbagua-Guangaje: Estudio Socioeconómico (Quito: Instituto Ecuatoriano de Antropología y Geografía, 1976), 4.


12. Oleas to Director of the JCAP, Mar. 6, 1939, Comunicaciones Recibidas, JCAP, pp. 956–57; Oleas to Director de Asistencia Pública, Feb. 9, 1938, Comunicaciones Recibidas, Primer Semestre, JCAP, pp. 1076–77. Inhabitants at Zumbahua later remembered the mayordomo Carlos Olivo (misspelled Olivia in this letter) as being particularly abusive. See, Guerrero, El Saber del Mundo de los Condores, 39.

13. Francisco Gómez de la Torre to Director of the JCAP, June 21, 1938, JCAP, p. 958;
A. Borrero Vega to Director of the JCAP, Sept. 22, 1938, Oficio no. 2405-AP, p. 642; Report from Cornejo, May 2, 1938, Comunicaciones Recibidas, Primer Semestre, JCAP, pp. 827–34.


18. Gómez de la Torre to Director of the JCAP, Oct. 3, 1939, Comunicaciones Recibidas, Primer Semestre, JCAP, p. 968.


20. Ormaza to Gómez de la Torre, Nov. 21, 1939, Oficio no. 455-G, Comunicaciones Dirigidas “G”; Ormaza to Sr. Ministro de Previsión Social y Asistencia Pública, Nov. 21, 1939, Oficio no. 152-M, Comunicaciones Dirigidas “M,” Julio–Diciembre 1939; Ormaza to Sr. Ministro de Previsión Social y Asistencia Pública, Jan. 17, 1940, Oficio no. 5-M, Comunicaciones Dirigidas “M,” Enero–Junio 1940; Arturo Salazar to Director of the JCAP, Apr. 3, 1940, Oficio no. 376-DGT, p. 542; Gómez de la Torre to Director of the JCAP, Apr. 17, 1940, JCAP, p. 689; Gómez de la Torre to Director of the JCAP, May 7, 1940, Comunicaciones Recibidas, Primer Semestre, JCAP, pp. 690–91.

21. Quoted in Gómez de la Torre to Director of the JCAP, Sept. 23, 1940, Comunicaciones Recibidas, Segundo Semestre, JCAP, pp. 930–32; Jaramillo Perez, Código del Trabajo, Articles 283, 284, 449, pp. 84, 132; Gómez de la Torre to Director of the JCAP, June 6, 1940, Comunicaciones Recibidas, Primer Semestre, JCAP, p. 692; Peloso, Peasants on Plantations, 154.

22. Ormaza to Sr. Intendente General de Carabineros de Cotopaxi, Aug. 12, 1940, Oficio no. 297-G, Comunicaciones Dirigidas “G,” Julio–Diciembre 1940, JCAP; Gómez de la Torre to Director of the JCAP, Sept. 23, 1940, JCAP, p. 930; Gómez de la Torre to Director of the JCAP, Aug. 30, 1940, Comunicaciones Recibidas, Segundo Semestre, JCAP, p. 933.

23. Gómez de la Torre to Director of the JCAP, Oct. 18, 1940, JCAP, p. 1034; Carlos Andrade Marín to Director of the JCAP, May 7, 1941, Oficio no. 1200/ES, Comunicaciones Recibidas, Segundo Semestre, JCAP, pp. 719–20; Jaramillo Perez, Código del Trabajo, Article 39, p. 26.

25. Alejandro Ponce Borja to Director of the JCAP, May 14, 1940, Comunicaciones Recibidas, Primer Semestre, JCAP, pp. 413–14.


27. Rafael Vallejo Larrea to Director of the JCAP, Oct. 7, 1942, Oficio no. 2450/ES, Comunicaciones Recibidas, Segundo Semestre, JCAP, pp. 718–19; Oleas to Director of the JCAP, Jan. 23, 1943, pp. 1000–1001; Petition included with a letter from Rafael Vallejo Larrea to Director of the JCAP, Mar. 16, 1943, Oficio no. 443-DGT, Comunicaciones Recibidas, Primer Semestre, JCAP, p. 714; Solicitude included in Rafael Vallejo Larrea to Director of the JCAP, Mar. 17, 1941, Oficio no. 777/ES, Comunicaciones Recibidas, Segundo Semestre, JCAP, pp. 721–22.


